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The chimera of proportionality: institutionalising limits on punishment in contemporary social and 
political systems 
Nicola Lacey* and Hanna Pickard**1 
Key words: Proportionality; punishment; desert theory; retributivism; comparative political 
economy; evolutionary psychology 
Abstract: 
The concept of proportionality has been central to the retributive revival in penal theory, and is the 
main idea underlying desert theory’s normative and practical commitment to limiting punishment.  
Theories of punishment combining desert-based and consequentialist considerations also appeal to 
proportionality as a limiting condition.  In this paper, we argue that these claims are founded on an 
exaggerated idea of what proportionality, in itself, can offer, and in particular fail properly to 
consider the question of what sorts of institutional conditions are needed in order to foster robust 
limits on the state’s power to punish. The idea that appeals to proportionality as an abstract ideal 
can help to limit punishment is, we argue, a chimera: what has been thought of as proportionality is 
not a naturally existing relationship, but a product of political and social construction, cultural 
meaning-making, and institution-building. Drawing on evolutionary psychology and comparative 
political economy, we argue that philosophers and social scientists need to work together to 
understand the ways in which the appeal of the idea of proportionality can best be realised through 
substantive institutional frameworks under particular conditions.  
* Departments of Law and Social Policy and Gender Institute, London School of Economics 
**All Souls College and Department of Philosophy, University of Oxford 
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Recent scholarship on punishment in developed countries has been much preoccupied with the turn 
away from rationales of punishment based on its supposed rehabilitative effects, and with the 
revival of retributivism in the modernised form of ‘just deserts’ or ‘the justice model’. Like all forms 
of retributivism, desert theory purports to offer a clear criterion defining the fittingness of penalties 
by reference to a particular offence by a particular offender . On this theory, punishment is justified 
in response to, by reason of, and in proportion to, the offender’s desert. Desert, in turn, is premised 
on his or her blameworthiness, which is generally understood in terms of a combination of harmful 
or wrongful conduct and culpability for that conduct: crucially, the ensuing punishment must be 
proportional to or commensurate with2 that culpability, thereby curtailing any tendency towards 
injustice in the form of punitive excess. A large literature has accumulated spanning a number of key 
questions about the justice model across a number of disciplines:  
                                                          
2
 The concepts of proportionality and commensurability are interchangeable: we focus on proportionality both 
because of its salience in the penal theory literature, and because of its analogous deployment in other areas 
such as human rights, and public, international and private law across many jurisdictions. For key examples 
amid an extensive literature, see R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Julian Rivers trans., 2002); A. Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); J. Bomhoff, Balancing Constitutional Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2013): 10-30; R. S. Frase, ‘Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth 
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review; A. Ristroph, 
‘Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government’ (2005) 55 Duke Law Journal 263. G. Letsas, ‘Rescuing 
Proportionality’, in R. Cruft, M. Liao and M. Renzo (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2014); I. Porat and M. Cohen-Eliya Proportionality and Constitutional 
Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013); E. Thomas Sullivan and R. S. Frase, Proportionality 
Principles in American Law: Controlling Excessive Government Actions (New York: Oxford University Press 
2008); and G. Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009C.  See also C. Steiker, ‘Prevention as a  Limit on the Preventive Justice’, in A. Ashworth 
and L. Zedner (eds.) Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2013) 194-213;  our 
paper seeks to explain and elaborate Steiker’s conclusion that a ‘sense of skepticism about proportionality’s 
promise combined with the daunting nature of the pitfalls it must negotiate should give pause even to 
proportionality’s many enthusiasts’ (id 213).   
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philosophical questions about the conceptual shape and normative justification of desert-based 
punishment3; legal and criminological questions about the best ways of realising the aspiration to 
deliver just deserts within legislative, sentencing and other criminal justice arrangements4; and 
sociological and political science questions about both the origins of the revival of retributivism and 
its effects5.  
Within this last genre of scholarship, it is widely acknowledged that, in countries such as the UK and, 
particularly, the USA, the aspiration of many proponents of the retributive revival6 to place clear 
limits on punishment by ensuring proportionality has not been fulfilled. Moreover, punitive 
rationales have in practice continued to be shaped by consequentialist considerations such as 
incapacitation and deterrence, with consequentialist and retributive considerations often blurred in 
not only public debate and political discourse but also sentencing practice. Yet other countries that 
embraced the justice model, notably Sweden, avoided the ‘grade inflation’ in sentencing that 
occurred in the US and the UK7. Views differ on just why this has been the case, and we are some 
distance from understanding the degree to which the turn to just deserts had any independent force 
                                                          
3
 J. Murphy, Punishment and the Moral Emotions. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012); A. von Hirsch, Doing 
Justice (Northeastern University Press, 1976); A. von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1993); R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001); D. 
McDermott ‘The Permissibility of Punishment’ (2001) Law and Philosophy 20: 403-32; M. Matravers, ‘Is 
Twenty-first Century Punishment Post-desert?’ (2011) 30-45 in Tonry (ed.) Retributivism Has a Past: Has It a 
Future? (New York: Oxford University Press 2011); M. S. Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997); and C. Bennett, The Apology Ritual: A Philosophical Theory of 
Punishment (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008). 
4
 A. Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition 2010); A. 
Ashworth and A. von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2005); and A. von Hirsch and N. Jareborg, 'Sweden's Sentencing Statute Enacted' (1989) Crim L Rev 275. 
5
 M. Tonry (ed.), Retributivism Has a Past: Has It a Future? (New York: Oxford University Press 2011); D. 
Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001); and J. Braithwaite and P. Pettit, Not 
Just Deserts (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990). 
6
 Andrew  von Hirsch’s Doing Justice (New York: Hill and Wang 1976) would be a key example. Advocates of 
just deserts have, of course, taken different views on the level of deserved punishment: ‘just deserts’ has been  
able to embrace very different penal policies precisely because of proportionality’s silence on the substance of 
criteria of equivalence – the very feature of the concept to which we draw attention in this article. 
7
J. Pratt and A. Eriksson, Contrasts in Punishment: An Explanation of Anglophone Excess and Nordic 
Exceptionalism (Abingdon and New York: Routledge 2013). 
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alongside changing patterns of crime and the undoubted economic, cultural and social factors which 
have contributed to the upswing in punitiveness in many liberal market countries since the 1970s8. 
In a recent paper9, we sketched an argument about the counter-productive implications of inviting 
‘affective blame’ – the hostile, negative emotions such as hatred, anger, resentment, indignation, 
disgust, disapproval, contempt and scorn, which often accompany a judgment of ‘detached blame’ 
in the sense of a judgment of blameworthiness – into the sentencing and penal process.  Drawing on 
a clinical model of holding patients responsible for harmful or wrongful behaviour without 
affectively blaming them, we made the case that a sentencing and penal process which equally 
sought to avoid affective blame would be entirely consistent with respect for an offender’s agency 
and responsibility for his or her offence. Even if a retributive rationale for punishment was accepted, 
we claimed, it would not follow that affective blame should be part of the criminal justice process, 
not least because there was reason to think that the retributive revival may have contributed to 
increasing punitiveness by legitimating hostile emotions against offenders without successfully 
institutionalising constraints on how these emotions should be expressed, acted upon and regulated. 
It follows that finding institutional mechanisms to distance affective blame is a key challenge for 
contemporary criminal justice systems; and we accordingly explored a number of ways in which such 
constraining mechanisms might be developed through adaptation of the protocols used to distance 
affective blame in the therapeutic process. Our paper also invited, but did not address, questions 
about the broader social and political conditions which might make the pursuit of penal 
responsibility without affective blame possible to achieve and, conversely, about the reasons why 
desert theory’s aspiration to limit punishment turned out to be hard to achieve in certain countries. 
                                                          
8
 N. Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008); and D. Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2001). 
9
 N. Lacey and H. Pickard, ‘From the Consulting Room to the Court Room? Taking the Clinical Model of 
Responsibility Without Blame into the Legal Realm’ (2012) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies doi: 
10.1093/ojls/gqs028. 
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In this paper, we turn to these further questions by focusing on the issue of proportionality – one of 
the central concepts of the retributive revival, and the main idea underlying its normative and 
practical commitment to limiting punishment10. Indeed, proportionality stands as the key concept in 
a much longer history of efforts to modernise and temper punishment, occupying as it does a central 
place in the work of Enlightenment thinkers and reformers across many nations: Beccaria, Bentham, 
Jefferson and Montesquieu11. The promise of proportionality not only remains central to the appeal 
of desert theory, but also commands allegiance from many theorists who support ‘mixed’ theories of 
punishment that combine desert-based and consequentialist considerations.12 But, as we shall argue 
in this paper, the retributive revival was founded on an exaggerated idea of what proportionality, in 
itself, could offer, and in particular failed properly to consider the question of what sorts of 
institutional conditions are needed in order to foster robust limits on the state’s power to punish.13 
The idea that appealing to proportionality as an abstract ideal can deliver limits to punishment, we 
will argue, is a chimera: for while proportionality has a clear formal meaning – indicating the 
existence of a broad moral equivalence or comparability between two different phenomena such as 
a particular crime and a particular penalty  – it only has substantive upshot where there is 
agreement about, or effective enforcement of, substantive criteria of equivalence or comparability.  
Thus, ideally, adequate limits to punishment need to be grounded in substantive judgements about 
fair and appropriate penalties which are meaningful to, and regarded as legitimate by, the populace 
in whose name they are imposed. The challenge, we suggest, is therefore for philosophers and social 
                                                          
10
 A. Ashworth and A. von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2005). 
11
 J. Q Whitman, ‘The Transition to Modernity’, in M. Dubber and T. Hörnle (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014). 
12
 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1968) (2
nd
 edition, ed. John Gardner, 
2007); and N. Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (London: Routledge 1988). 
Indeed, ideas of proportionality may also be invoked in relation to purely consequentialist considerations, 
where sanctions may be conceived as proportionate to estimated costs and benefits. The main claims about 
proportionality’s limiting capacity in recent debates derive, however, from the just deserts tradition, and 
accordingly we focus on these arguments. 
13
 While not couched explicitly in terms of proportionality, the recent English Court of Appeal case considering 
whether whole life sentences offend against human rights standards is an instructive example of the difficulty 
of constructing determinate arguments in this area: http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/feb/18/whole-
life-sentences-can-continue-appeal-court-rules (accessed 18 February 2014).  
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scientists to work together to understand the ways in which the undoubted appeal of the idea of 
proportionality – an appeal which is reflected in its currency in a wide range of prevailing social and 
legal discourses, many of them concerned with the limitation of power14 – can best be articulated 
within such a substantive framework under contemporary conditions. What has been thought of as 
proportionality, in short, is not a naturally existing relationship, but a product of political and social 
construction, cultural meaning-making, and institution-building.  
The paper falls into three parts. First, we describe the emergence of neoclassical penal philosophy in 
the guise of ‘just deserts’, sketching the main causes of its resurgence and the main ethical and 
political aspirations of its supporters, before proceeding to examine the impact of the just deserts 
movement, and to evaluate its contribution to justice and humanity in punishment. In the second 
part of the paper, we review certain features of the operation of punishment in early modern 
systems, arguing that their capacity to coordinate punishment in such a way that it was perceived as 
fitting to the crime derived from a hierarchical social order, an association of certain forms of penal 
and political authority with the sacred, and the currency of a distinctive symbolism of equivalence. 
Though quite inconsistent with modern ideas of proportionality, particularly in the discretionary 
power which implied uneven application of penalties, we suggest that these three features of the 
context in which penal practice went forward in very different societies sheds light on how 
substantive criteria of fittingness or equivalence depend upon background social and cultural 
conditions.  We then draw on this analysis to argue that the neoclassical revival of the late 20th 
century was problematic from its inception, because the metaphors of ‘desert’ and proportionality, 
particularly in certain countries,  are no longer so obviously grounded in the widely shared symbolic 
systems representing agreed social norms, or in forms of political or religious authority, which 
previously animated and stabilised substantive judgments of equivalence or fittingness. 15 
                                                          
14
  E. Thomas Sullivan and R. S. Frase, Proportionality Principles in American Law: Controlling Excessive 
Government Actions (New York: Oxford University Press 2008). 
15
 In the light of the failure of the neoclassical revival to foster stability, fairness and moderation in penal policy 
in liberal market systems such as the UK and the US, it is not surprising that some of the most imaginative 
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Proportionality, in other words, does not have an independent effect: where it ‘works’ to limit 
punishment, this is because of its articulation of, and resonance with, deeper conventions, 
normative systems, political institutions, and social structures.  
In the third part of the paper, we explore what can be learnt from existing research – notably from 
the comparative political economy of punishment and from evolutionary psychology – about the 
conditions under which meaningful limits on punishment can be institutionalised in contemporary 
polities, which are configured differently not only from early modern systems but also from one 
another. Most of the institutional mechanisms, and many of the evaluative ideas, which generated 
limits on punishment in early modern systems, lack moral and practical purchase under late modern 
conditions, particularly in liberal market countries. Hence, unfortunately, the revival of retributivism 
has all too readily translated, under certain conditions, into a politics of anger, affective blaming and 
‘othering’ of offenders – a process against which appeals to proportionality have little bite, and in 
which retributive policies are in fact counter-productive to the very aims of many of the liberal 
supporters of the retributive revival.16 But we argue that much can be learnt about the conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
penal theorists in recent years have reached back into older symbolic resources such as mercy and forgiveness, 
many of them with theological resonance, to try to reconstruct desert theory in less potentially vengeful and 
narrowly retributive terms. In a further paper, we consider what form a process of institutional reconfiguration 
to reanimate meaningful limits on punishment might feasibly take under the conditions of modern 
representative democracy. Starting out from what we take to be a core aspiration of punishment under liberal 
democratic conditions - that penal practices should not be inconsistent with the offender’s ultimate 
reconciliation and reintegration, and that it should be consistent with a general right to equal concern and 
respect (R. Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth 1977); and R. Dworkin A Matter of Principle 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1985)) - we turn to the concept of forgiveness, drawing on philosophical 
analysis and evolutionary psychology to examine the conditions which foster it and those which undermine it, 
and considering how institutional counterparts of interpersonal forgiveness might be constructed so as to 
generate the sorts of limits on state punishment which are widely associated with proportionality (N. Lacey 
and H. Pickard, ‘To blame or to forgive? Reconciling punishment and forgiveness in criminal justice’ (under 
review).  
16
 Our argument is reinforced by the empirical evidence in moral psychology and behavioural economics 
reviewed by Victoria McGeer (V. McGeer, ‘Civilising Blame’ in D.J. Coates and N.A. Tognazzini (eds), Blame: Its 
Nature and Norms (Oxford University Press 2013); and ‘Retributivism and the Psychology of Blame’, paper on 
file with the author). This evidence suggests that though the demand for retributive punishment in response to 
wrongdoing appears to be a very basic feature of human affect, the fact of punishment does not bring the 
expected feelings of satisfaction or vindication. This, McGeer argues, implies that a retributive penal system 
untempered by regulative features oriented to the maintenance of a continued relationship between offender 
and victim will be counter-productive in that it will simply react to what are, in effect, insatiable feelings of 
anger leading to ever greater demands for punishment. Cf G.H. Mead’s analysis of some of the dangers of the 
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under which delineated limits on punishment command authority by examining the broader 
institutional structure of polities whose systems of punishment have indeed achieved stability. 
Drawing analogies between findings in evolutionary psychology and those in the comparative study 
of punishment about the broad conditions which foster reconciliatory as opposed to vengeful 
reactions to hostile or harmful conduct, we argue that the different impact of the just deserts 
movement – and of the ‘neoclassical’ revival of ideas of proportionality more generally - in countries 
like the US or England and Wales as compared with Nordic countries is in significant part to be 
attributed to institutional as well as cultural features of the economic and political system in those 
countries.  
The structure of the argument is as follows. In section A, we argue that the neoclassical claim that 
punishment is limited by proportionality is belied by the fact that recent years have shown a 
significant upswing in punitiveness in some but not all countries which adopted the ‘justice model’ 
amid the neoclassical revival. In section B, we argue that proportionality is a chimera when appealed 
to in the abstract; the notion of a stable social sense of ‘fittingness’ of punishment to crime can be 
worked out only under very particular conditions – some of them illustrated by early modern 
societies, in which the conditions which underpinned that achievement are ones which we no longer 
have nor would we wish to have. In section C, we show that the contemporary societies which have 
managed to sustain stable limits on punishment have done so not through appeals to proportionality 
as such, but rather through institutions and attitudes that foster reconciliatory dispositions between 
citizens, and we show that this finding is supported by a developing literature in evolutionary 
psychology about the conditions which orient people towards the choice of reconciliatory as 
opposed to retaliatory responses to hostile conduct. Irrespective of any appeal to proportionality, 
those systems which feature cultural and institutional arrangements which foster high ‘Associational 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
dynamic of vengeance within social groups (G. H. Mead, ‘The Psychology of Punitive Justice’ (1918) American 
Journal of Sociology 23, 577-602), discussed below. 
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Value’ – in other words, a higher expected value of continued cooperation between individuals and 
groups – also foster reconciliatory dispositions.  
 
A: The neo-classical revival and its effects 
The articulated justification – or perhaps we should say rationalisation – of punishment in Western 
countries over the past two hundred and fifty years has followed a relatively clear, and widely 
discussed, trajectory17. To sketch this historical story only crudely: the early modern retributive 
corporal penalties gradually gave way, from the late 18th century, as a ‘civilising’ process issued in a 
preference for less overtly violent, and less publically visible, forms of sanctioning. By the same 
token, a demand arose for the highly discretionary forms of power, through which early modern 
penalties were typically delivered, to be rationalised and regularised as a result of the gradual 
modernisation and democratisation of the hierarchical forms of political authority from which they 
emanated. Beccaria18 and Bentham19 are, with good reason, thought of as the key figures in this 
modernisation of the rationale of punishment, though Beccaria is of particular importance in that his 
work stands as an important modern source of both of the two main ideas which have coincided and 
competed with one another as justifications of state punishment. These are, first, the ‘neo-classical’ 
argument that punishment is in some sense a morally appropriate equivalent to an offence, and is 
thus constrained by the requirement of proportionality (an argument to be found in pure retributive 
form in the work of, for example, Kant, who further saw the imposition of deserved punishment as 
obligatory rather than merely permissible); and, second, the utilitarian argument that punishment, 
as a prima facie evil, can only be justified by countervailing good consequences, achieved through 
                                                          
17
 For an overview, see D. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society (New York: Oxford University Press 1990): 
213-248; see also V. A. C. Gatrell, The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People 1770-1868 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1994). 
18
 C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764: Seven Treasures Publications, 2009). 
19
 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (ed. H.L.A. Hart and J.H. Burns, (1781; 
London: Athlone Press 1970) (2
nd
 Ed, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 
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specific or general deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, restitution or moral education (an 
argument most rigorously worked out by Bentham).  
The ideas that punishment is in some deep sense retribution for a blameworthy act or an 
institutionalised expression of affective blame, and that an offender’s blameworthy conduct is what 
justifies punishment, have deep historical roots. Yet the fortunes of retributive theories of 
punishment based on culpability – blameworthiness in the sense of responsibility for wrongful 
conduct - have been mixed, particularly since the development of consequentialist justifications for 
punishment, from the writings of Cesar Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham to the present day. The details 
of this history lie well beyond the scope of this paper. But a brief review of the relative fortunes of 
retributive and consequentialist rationales is useful in identifying the precise misunderstandings 
about the concept of proportionality as the modern expression of the retributive ethic, and about its 
capacity to anchor punishment within clear limits, to which we want to draw attention.  
Until the 18th century, what we might call a retributivism of symbolic equivalence dominated both 
the theory and practice of punishment in most of Europe.  To focus on England as an example,  a 
panoply of (to our eyes) harsh corporal and social penalties – branding, maiming, whipping, 
pillorying, the use of the branks or ‘scold’s bridle’ and, ultimately, capital punishment – deemed 
equivalent to the relevant offence, and inflicted in public, hence reinforcing spectators’ 
apprehension of that equivalence. In a pre-democratic world, the moral logic of the lex talionis - ‘an 
eye for an eye…’ - appears to have struck a deep chord, not least because of the resonance between 
penal authority and various Christian doctrines. Indeed the idea that penalties should be measured 
and proportionate finds its origins in the ecclesiastical law practice of imposing graduated fines20 – a 
practice in stark contrast to princely, secular early modern penalties, in which the monarch’s power 
                                                          
20
 J. Q Whitman, ‘The Transition to Modernity’, in M. Dubber and T. Hörnle (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014). 
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to punish or to pardon through an exercise of ‘grace’ was the antithesis of the classical aspiration to 
mete out even-handedly a ‘just measure of pain’21.  
A robust form of retributivism – the idea that the application of a deserved penalty is, a priori, a self-
evident good barely requiring justification, indeed something which is morally required – appears 
not to have posed significant problems of legitimation. It is only from the middle of the 18th century 
that this self-evidence of punishment seems to have been under challenge. This was for a number of 
reasons. They include the emergence of more egalitarian and democratic ideas in Europe and North 
America; the growth of sentiments opposed to the public display of violence; and the growing 
regulatory ambitions of a more organised state. For both moral and prudential reasons, the banal 
violence of the early modern penalties began to be questioned, and the seeds of a reformed penal 
system, focused not only on doing justice but also on disciplining the subjects of punishment in a 
more systematic way, notably through the modernisation and expansion of the prison, were 
planted22. But the declining self-evidence of the ancien régime in punishment may, ironically, also 
have had to do with the attempted rationalisation and modernisation of retributivism which 
Beccaria’s (and Kant’s) philosophy exemplified, with the growing acceptance that punishment 
required abstract moral justification itself a reaction to the declining force of early modern symbols 
of equivalence largely expressed through physical punishments. In particular, the recognition that 
desert is calibrated not only with the offender’s misconduct or manifested bad character but, 
importantly and additionally, with the degree of the offender’s responsibility, disrupted any simple 
symbolism of equivalence. 
This was not, of course, in the nature of a clean break from retributivism to utilitarianism; in 
particular, religious overtones to punishment as a form of atonement persisted. The modern prison 
                                                          
21
 M. Ignatieff, A just measure of pain: the penitentiary in the industrial revolution, 1750-1850 (Pantheon Books 
1978). 
22
 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (transl. Alan Sheridan, London: Allen Lane 1977); 
M. Ignatieff, A just measure of pain: the penitentiary in the industrial revolution, 1750-1850 (Pantheon Books 
1978). 
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was, after all, constructed as a ‘penitentiary’, and early prison regimes were strongly focused on 
encouraging the offender to reflect on his or her wrongdoing and come to a state of repentance – an 
idea which it was possible to bring into conformity with the utilitarian goals of discipline and 
reformation which were becoming so influential.23 Conversely, many pre-modern penalties – 
branding and whipping for example – must surely have had incapacitative and deterrent rationales 
and effects alongside their retributive foundations. But as the 19th century wore on, the moral 
project of modern imprisonment became increasingly tied up with the calculation of its 
consequences: initially with more discourses focused on deterrence; then on identifying, through 
social Darwinist ideas and, ultimately, Lombrosian criminology, certain ‘types’ in need of moral re-
education or incapacitation; and, as we move into the 20th century, with a welfarist philosophy 
applied to the rehabilitation of offenders.24 
The first two thirds of the 20th century have been, aptly, characterised in Garland’s influential work 
as a period in which punishment in most advanced democracies was increasingly constructed in 
welfarist terms25. While punishment was certainly viewed as an appropriate state reaction to 
wrongdoing, and the panoply of responses deployed by most democratic societies included a range 
of severe sanctions, often including capital punishment, the infliction of hard treatment was 
tempered by a distinctively welfarist or ameliorative spirit. Probation and the development of 
various forms of training for young offenders were early signs of this penal welfarism. And after the 
Second World War, particularly in countries like Britain and the United States, a distinctive form of 
penal welfarism – widely known as the rehabilitative ideal – established itself as a central rationale 
for state punishment. Punishment was justified by appeal to its potentially rehabilitative 
                                                          
23
 See M. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal (Cambridge University Press 1991) 
24
  See D. Garland, Punishment and Welfare (Aldershot: Gower 1985) 
25
  Ibid.: see also D. Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001). 
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consequences; and the variety of ameliorative and even therapeutic programmes and ‘treatments’ 
burgeoned26.  
The penal practices and articulated penal policies and principles of national governments, of course, 
typically exhibit a mixture of potentially philosophically incompatible elements such as general and 
special deterrence, incapacitation, reform, denunciation, reprobation and retribution. So one should 
not exaggerate the completeness with which a welfarist or rehabilitative ethic prevailed across penal 
practices of the countries which followed the welfarist path. But it did, undoubtedly, enjoy a period 
of dominance; and, just as clearly, its influence declined as a result of a decisive change in public 
penal philosophy from the 1970s on. As recently as 1968, H.L.A. Hart, in his postscript to Punishment 
and Responsibility27, reflected something approaching a liberal consensus when he remarked that 
‘Few people would now advocate so thoroughgoing a variety of retribution as the pure retributive 
view which regards the return of suffering for moral evil voluntarily done [as] itself just or morally 
good’28, let alone the further Kantian view that such punishment is not merely morally permissible 
but morally obligatory29. While Hart accorded some respect to the argument that the value of 
punishment consists in ‘the authoritative expression… of moral condemnation for the moral 
wickedness involved in the offence’ – an institutionalised communication of resentment – the idea 
that returning suffering for evil is intrinsically good is regarded as ‘a mysterious piece of moral 
alchemy’ or ‘a primitive confusion’ between punishment and compensation30. The prevailing sense 
of Hart’s book is a confident liberal consensus that, while consequentialist approaches to 
punishment could be abused and subject to excesses, and that adequate limits on the distribution 
and quantum of punishment were a key concern, pure retributivism was an echo of the past. Yet a 
mere 20 years after the publication of Hart’s influential collection, the retributive tradition, 
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repackaged as the ‘just deserts movement’ or the ‘justice model’, had captured the imagination of 
both policy makers and penal philosophers in the USA, the United Kingdom and many other 
countries. How did this happen? 
The reasons for the demise of the rehabilitative ideal are well known31, and we will not rehearse 
them in any detail here. Two important concerns were uppermost. First, the rehabilitative ideal led 
to a rise in lengthy indeterminate sentences based on predictions of ‘dangerousness’ or need for 
treatment, and implied broad and unaccountable official discretion as to release date, based on 
expert judgments about prognosis, risk and ‘cure’. Alongside this concern with executive discretion 
sat a civil libertarian concern about the capacity of indeterminate sentencing to violate offenders’ 
rights. The concern to establish respect for agency and responsibility as core values of the criminal 
process was not, of course, restricted to proponents of ‘just deserts’32: it also characterised theories 
which seek to combine backward-looking and forward-looking considerations in the justification of 
punishment33. But the justice model successfully presented itself as the approach best able to 
generate an account of punishment compatible with both full respect for offenders as agents and 
the modern ambition to achieve even-handedness, constrained discretion and – most important to 
our argument in this paper - limits on state punishment. 
The limiting principles celebrated by the justice model are underpinned by the further claim that a 
certain proportionality can be built in to the quantum of punishment; and that this in turn is 
guaranteed by the backward-looking orientation of punishment’s justification. The idea that 
punishment is conditioned on, and responds to, blameworthiness implies that the punishment must 
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be proportionate to it. It was therefore widely assumed – and hoped – that the proportionality 
implied by desert would provide clear limits on punishment. By linking not only the justification but 
the distribution and quantum of punishment to the offender’s desert, in the sense of the level of 
blameworthiness appropriately to be attached to the offence, the justice model appeared to offer a 
clear limit on  the extent of the state’s right to punish, and presented itself as a progressive, humane 
and liberal approach. 
This aspiration is, however, very far from having been universally realised in practice. Thirty years 
on, the practical impact of the justice model presents a mixed picture, and in liberal market 
countries such as England and Wales, Scotland, Australia, New Zealand and - most spectacularly - the 
United States, the scale of punishment has increased relentlessly. This penal ‘grade inflation’ has a 
number of different dimensions, of which we here mention only the most obvious. The 
imprisonment rate per hundred thousand of the population has soared, as a result of both 
increasing flows of defendants through the criminal courts and a rise in sentence levels, particularly 
for certain categories of offence34. Mandatory sentencing systems have become a common feature 
of these liberal market systems, and many of the sentencing guideline systems designed to foster 
the determinacy sought by the justice model35 in fact led to longer sentences as a result of the 
political choice to structure them around very high tariff scales, and to reduce judicial discretion to 
temper sentence severity36. In addition, prison conditions in many of these countries have 
deteriorated, with not only overcrowding but also deliberately punitive and restrictive regimes 
ousting longstanding ameliorative programmes focused on education, vocational training, drug and 
alcohol treatment, and therapeutic interventions37. Finally, stigmatising post-sentence conditions 
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and disqualifications, which are inimical to reintegration, such as disenfranchisement, placement on 
offender registers, and ineligibility for certain jobs and public benefits, have been, particularly in the 
United States, on the rise38. 
Furthermore, a number of countries in which the justice model had the most decisive influence on 
policy – notably the United States and England and Wales – have also seen a continuation or even 
acceleration of practices, such as indeterminate sentencing and preventive justice, which were 
thought to express the more extreme injustices and disrespect for the rights and agency of the 
offender that characterised the rehabilitative ideal, in principle and in practice39. It turns out, as 
Jeffrie Murphy has put it, that retributivism has two faces: one oriented to justice and respect for 
responsible agency; the other oriented to vengeance and to moral emotions such as resentment, 
anger and other hostile, negative attitudes typical of affective blame, which when allowed to issue in 
what Murphy calls ‘deep character’ retributivism can easily rationalise severe and ‘othering’ 
penalties40. And appeals to ‘proportionality’ have little limiting potential here, for while empirical 
studies indicate a noteworthy degree of consensus, even across different countries, on the relative 
seriousness of standard offences – so-called ‘ordinal proportionality’41 – they reveal no such 
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consensus about what this implies in terms of what penalty is suitable – ‘cardinal proportionality’42. 
In ‘core’ areas of criminal law, appeals to ordinal proportionality may therefore provide some basis 
for institutional arrangements such as sentencing guidelines;43 and indeed the various programmes 
of sentencing reform launched in many jurisdictions in the wake of the just deserts movement 
provide plentiful examples of successful institutionalisation of stable relativities between penalties.  
But the lack of any comparable consensus about cardinal proportionality implies that appeals to 
proportionality are, under current conditions, unlikely to be a successful basis for institutionalising 
substantive criteria of a punishment’s ‘fitness’ - hence, as we argue, rendering the appeal to 
proportionality chimerical as a basis for limiting punishment. In the light of this difficulty, it is 
therefore not surprising that many desert theorists have focused primarily on ordinal rather than 
cardinal proportionality.  But the very idea that a certain punishment is deserved – and with it, the 
whole basis for proportionality’s purported capacity to set upper limits on, or to generate substantial 
criteria of fittingness of, punishment - rests on cardinal rather than ordinal proportionality.   
Strikingly, in other countries which also moved towards sentencing guidelines and a range of 
institutional arrangements counselled by the justice model’s version of neoclassical retributivism, 
which emphasises the importance of responsible agency – notably Sweden and the other Nordic 
countries44  – the increase in the scale and intensity of punishment has been less marked. Clearly, 
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both trends in crime and in public concern about crime, as well as distinct penological traditions and 
sentencing institutions45, are at issue here. But the very different impact of the justice model in 
different countries raises important questions about the cultural, political, social and institutional 
conditions under which the retributive revival invites an escalation of insatiable affective blame, and 
those under which it fosters – or can be made consistent with – determinacy and moderation in 
punishment. It raises questions, in short, about the cultural and institutional arrangements which 
can make the metaphor of proportionality meaningful, and punishment accordingly limited in real 
terms.  
 
B: Fixing punishment in early modern systems: symbolic equivalence, status hierarchy and the 
sacred  
In addressing these questions, a useful place to start is by looking at certain features of the penal 
systems which predated the modern push towards consequentialism in punishment, or which 
continue to exist in parts of the world whose penal practices were less decisively affected by the 
processes of modernisation and democratisation which swept Europe and the United States in the 
18th and 19th centuries. In many of their earlier forms, retributive ideas related to wider frameworks 
of social and ethical meaning which underpinned prevailing social and political systems and 
institutional practices – an environment which had fundamentally changed by the time attempts 
were made, in the 1970s, to revive and realise retributive ideas. An effort to understand the nature 
of the lost cosmology which leant meaning to early modern punishments – impressionistic as it must 
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be within the confines of a single paper – may, we suggest, help to explain such capacity as they 
enjoyed to institutionalise a practice of retributive punishments within clear limits, the very 
‘distance’ of the examples helping us to think more imaginatively about how the legitimation of 
penal practices is shaped by prevailing interests, institutions and ideas.  
 
Both the historical and the conceptual foundations of retributivism are generally associated with the 
lex talionis.  Taking this as our core example therefore - while bearing in mind the analogies with 
other systems such as the corporal penalties typical of the early modern criminal justice systems of 
Europe and the system of penalties prescribed by Sharia law - we would suggest that early systems 
of retributivism had at least three distinctive features key to their legitimation and stability. The first 
was a social ontology of status hierarchy which rendered the legitimation of punishment a far less 
pressing issue than it is in liberal societies which place a high value on individual autonomy46, and 
which prescribed different forms of penalty calibrated with social class and oriented to widely 
understood marks of degradation47. The second was a vision of penal authority tied to the sacred. 
This was manifested in either religious doctrines of damnation, expiation, atonement, penitence and 
so on, or a vision of political authority marked by symbols of supra-human or highly particular 
human authority such as the ‘divinity’ or ‘majesty’, implying the princely power not only to punish 
but to pardon through the exercise of ‘grace’48. The third was what we will call a shared symbolism 
of equivalence. Of course, few systems have attempted to enact literally the symbols of cardinal 
proportionality contained in the lex talionis.  But the fact is that, to contemporaries, prescribed 
punishments in many early modern systems related in some intuitively meaningful way to the wrong 
done (and typically did so independently of any psychological judgments of responsibility which 
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complicate assessment of culpability in modern desert theory, and which emerge alongside modern, 
psychological conceptions of selfhood49). Each of these conditions made it possible to coordinate the 
expectations of the relevant actors so that they were in agreement on not only the need for a penal 
response, but equally the appropriate shape which that response might take. If we look back to the 
early modern English penalties which seem so cruel, horrifying and indeed disproportionate today, 
we can nonetheless acknowledge that they found their form, and took their place, within a 
composite view of political authority which itself drew on symbols, doctrines and common values, as 
well as being stabilised by a rigid status hierarchy and an authoritarian system of governance – 
conditions which also applied, of course, to the church, whose panoply of graduated fines represent 
a fascinating precursor to modern conceptions of proportionality50. This was, of course, by our 
standards an unduly hierarchical and undemocratic world; and the rituals which elaborated different 
forms of capital penalty, as well as the different forms of corporal penalty such as branding, 
pillorying and so on, strike us, for good reason, as deeply inhumane. Moreover the idea of 
punishment before the public gaze – a key condition for the diffusion of shared perceptions of 
symbolic equivalence – is now regarded as fundamentally uncivilised.51 But it is worth remembering 
that the worldview from which these penal practices proceeded was one in which the symbols of 
state and penal authority formed part of a broader cosmology of authority and right, itself often 
bound up with claims about divine or traditional legitimation, and one which commanded respect 
well beyond the elite.  
Consider, for instance, the widespread popular participation in the drama of the scaffold – not only 
as crowds witnessing executions52, but as consumers of the many forms of popular culture. These 
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include the criminal autobiographies which, in the form of Defoe’s Moll Flanders53, finally 
transmuted into an early form of the realist novel54; the Newgate Ordinary’s widely read reports on 
the spiritual condition and conduct of the condemned in the run-up to execution; and the street 
ballads and pamphlets which were preoccupied with not only the drama of justice being done but 
also the condemned offender’s reception of the punishment. Often – and, within this literary genre, 
ideally – such reception included scaffold speeches that consisted of confession and penitence, 
transforming execution into a potential scene of redemption within Christian cosmology. Indeed, 
many historians’ accounts of the behaviour of the scaffold crowd and of the choreography of the 
procession and execution process suggest that the offender’s confession was key to the successful 
enactment of what amounted to a highly ritualised – and cathartic – form of drama55. Despite the 
hierarchical authority and power with which punishment was meted out, all the participants had a 
part to play in the script.56 
The vision of legitimate power and authority which underpinned the early modern English penal 
system did not, of course, consist only or even primarily in Christian doctrines: here as in other early 
(and some existing) systems, social codes of honour and status were also important57. But there can 
be little doubt that this world of widely shared deference to authority, and vision of authority as 
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vested with, broadly, sacred significance – think, for example, of the conception of ‘majesty’ – made 
a certain sense of penal practices, constituting penality as one among many social rituals in which 
that hierarchical authority was enacted. Within this system of meaning and the prevailing cultural, 
moral and political economy, as Douglas Hay has persuasively argued58, prerogatives such as 
pardoning and mercy, highly discretionary and unevenly applied though they were, made sense. But, 
as the source and form of political authority has been subject to a process of systematisation and 
rationalisation in the construction of the modern nation state, older forms of ordering and of 
meaning-making have been eroded.59  
Equally important, the symbolism of equivalence which underpins the lex talionis, sharia justice, or 
the corporal and capital penalties perhaps most vividly exemplified by Foucault’s famous portrayal 
of the execution of the regicide Damiens in the opening pages of Discipline and Punish60 have, for 
the majority of those living in Western countries, lost their persuasive appeal. But to 
contemporaries, not only the complex dramaturgy represented by spectacular penalties such as that 
of Damiens, but more routine corporal penalties such as maiming and branding, related in some 
intuitively meaningful way to the wrong done. 
The effort to build a modern equivalent to the lex talionis has long taken the form of appeals to 
proportionality. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson’s 1778 Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in 
the early formation of the United States combines the appeal to proportionality with a continuing 
commitment to talionic punishments to a striking degree: ’Whosoever on purpose and of malice 
forethought shall maim another, or shall disfigure him, by cutting out or disabling the tongue, slitting 
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or cutting off a nose, lip or ear, branding, or otherwise, shall be maimed or disfigured in like sort: or 
if that cannot be for want of the same part, then as nearly as may be in some other part of at least 
equal value and estimation in the opinion of a jury. . .’61. In the neoclassical revival of the late 20th 
century, the appeal to proportionality tended to be realised rather in the technical form of 
procedural mechanisms such as sentencing guideline systems. But the stark fact is that those 
systems produce staggeringly different judgments of what counts as a ‘proportional’ penalty for, say, 
theft, rape or manslaughter, in countries such as Sweden on the one hand and the USA on the other 
– countries which, for all their differences, share many features of political and social culture and 
economic development. Moreover there are significant differences between what is now considered 
proportionate within particular countries as compared with 40 years ago – as exemplified by the 
emergence of mandatory sentencing in many jurisdictions, notably the United States and England 
and Wales.62  We now live in a world which has largely moved away from attachment to physical 
symbols of penal equivalence, from the established markers of status hierarchy which underpinned 
deference to established political authority as such, and from a view of political authority as invested 
with sacred power – all features which contributed to the stabilisation of criteria of ‘fitting’ 
punishment63  The modern answer to the (unappealing) pre-modern equilibrium is an appeal to 
proportionality.  But such an appeal can in itself contribute little to the construction of norms 
adequate to limit state punishment. Indeed, proportionality represents an intuitively shared starting 
point precisely because it is virtually indeterminate in its substantive implications: in other words, it 
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simply defers the crucial and complicated processes of meaning-making, consensus-building and 
institutional development. 
 
 
C: The conditions of ‘proportionality’ in late modern systems 
To modern readers, the suggestion that there is anything to be learnt of relevance to penal reform 
today from early modern penal systems, let alone that such systems were better able to fix 
conventional values on punishment which were in some sense ‘proportionate’ or ‘equivalent’ in the 
way we think of these requirements today, may seem outlandish. Our implicit self-understanding, in 
both our penal thinking and our political thinking, is that the last three centuries have been, albeit 
with horrifying setbacks, an era of progress and of increasing civilisation, not least in our practices of 
punishment. That progress is associated with a recasting of what we might call the cosmologies, or 
systems of symbolic meaning, which animated and legitimised older practices of punishment and 
state authority, as atavistic, pre-modern, part of the ancien régime. In the process of modernisation, 
those symbolic systems were either fully rejected as irrational or uncivilised, or demoted in political 
importance. But if they were indeed important in calibrating, legitimising and stabilising punishment, 
efforts at penal reform may have been hindered by a failure to appreciate their role or to 
acknowledge the impossibility of reviving them by an act of political will. The neoclassical aspiration 
was to create modern mechanisms for fixing cardinal as well as ordinal proportionality; but the 
impact as well as the shape of such mechanisms has varied decisively even among otherwise 
comparable countries. This raises questions about the implications of the value pluralism and 
heterogeneity typical of individualistic and secularised western democracies, and particularly in the 
competitive political systems of the liberal market economies such as the United Kingdom and the 
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United States, for our efforts to garner consensus about appropriate limits on punishment under 
contemporary conditions.  
A useful goal is therefore to work towards an understanding of the institutional conditions and 
broader social arrangements under which a successful orientation to limited punishment and to 
reconciliation may be stabilised. In this section, we begin this task, arguing that this capacity is 
greatest where – by broad analogy with early modern systems - appeals to proportionality connect 
with a larger shared frame of common meaning and consensus about legitimate authority64; and 
where they take place within a social and institutional context in which the relevant actors share 
expectations of both interdependence and the ability of social norms and institutions to coordinate 
effective cooperation between them in the medium to long term.65 This thesis is based on two very 
different fields of research. First it draws on work in evolutionary psychology which explores the 
significance of two contrasting standard responses to exploitative behaviour: vengeance and 
reconciliation; and which draws a clear distinction between the evaluation of level of seriousness of 
offence and the choice of response. As we shall argue below, this research has some interesting 
implications for our efforts to understand why some modern social orders seem better able to 
institutionalise moderation in punishment than do others. Second, our thesis draws on several 
paradigms in comparative political economy which have developed models of distinctive social, 
economic and political systems with differential capacities to coordinate behaviour, motivate 
consensus, and be guided by an orientation to long term relationships between members. Focusing 
on the implications of these literatures in evolutionary psychology and in the comparative political 
economy of varieties of capitalism, political systems and welfare regimes, we aim to produce an 
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analysis of the political, social and institutional conditions which are most likely to stabilise and 
moderate the conventions of proportionality in punishment. 
Literature in evolutionary psychology (as well as in game theory) has explored the ways in which 
group members react to hostile conduct and how these impact on relationships and group 
dynamics66. Two basic responses to hostile conduct exist: retaliatory and reconciliatory. Retaliatory 
responses aim to reduce motivation to exploit others by imposing a cost and thereby adjusting the 
expected benefit of any hostile conduct for the aggressor in future. Reconciliatory responses, in 
contrast, aim to reduce motivation to exploit others by seeking to restore cooperative relationships, 
thereby preserving the possibility of mutually beneficial interactions between group members in 
future. Both responses thus aim to protect against future exploitation, but also carry risks. 
Retaliatory responses risk escalating aggression and threatening the fabric of on-going relationships. 
Retaliation protects against future exploitation only in so far as the aggressor fears getting caught 
and so being subjected to retaliation: it fosters no intrinsic desire to end hostilities in the aggressor; 
indeed, it may undermine any such desire and hence increase aggression. The success of retaliation 
as a response therefore depends on adequate monitoring of the aggressor and possession of the 
power to effectively harm them in turn. Reconciliatory responses demand a willingness to forgive 
the aggressor and wipe the slate clean for the sake of future mutually beneficial relations. 
Reconciliation aims to foster an intrinsic desire in the aggressor to end hostilities by eliciting remorse 
and recognition of the value of the relationship. It therefore does not depend on monitoring and 
power. Reconciliatory responses do however risk leaving the forgiving party vulnerable to future 
exploitation, if the aggressor deceives them about their commitment to avoid hostilities and 
maintain good relations. Nonetheless, from the long-term perspective, reconciliatory responses are 
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optimal when successful, for they reduce the risk of the aggressor perpetrating harm without 
incurring the cost of monitoring and the maintenance of coercive power, in the future, while 
bringing the benefit of maintaining relationships so far as possible.  
Conditions that foster both the likelihood and the viability of adopting a reconciliatory response 
include: being in a kin relationship; recognition of the aggressor’s work or other social productivity; 
the aggressor’s remorse or repentance; and the mutual dependence in various forms of the 
aggressor and other members of the group. Within evolutionary psychology, these conditions are 
understood as pertaining in one way or another to perception of the aggressor’s ‘Associational 
Value’: in other words, the value which can be expected to derive from future interactions with 
them. Where Associational Value is high, the orientation to forgiveness and reconciliation is 
accordingly enhanced; where it is low, either because of features of the aggressor themselves or the 
relationship they have with members of the group – or, as we shall suggest below, features of the 
socio-political environment – the orientation to retaliation will be stronger. Evaluations of how to 
react to a hostile act, holding evaluations of its seriousness constant, are accordingly shaped by 
Associational Value: by the expected value of future interactions with the offender. 67 
This research resonates with an extensive literature in comparative political economy. The 
Associational Value findings suggests that countries with higher levels of social solidarity and trust 
will be those in which it is easiest to create institutions and practices oriented towards reconciliation 
and hence moderate retributive excess; and that it may be harder to generate barriers to retaliation 
and escalating aggression, and incentives to reconciliation, in large scale, anonymous, urbanised 
societies, where confident evaluations of high future Associational Value are harder to make. 
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Indeed, comparative sociological evidence supports this suggestion, in that the countries which have 
experienced the most dramatic increase in punitiveness over the last 40 years are those with the 
lowest levels of solidarity and trust and the highest levels of heterogeneity along a range of social 
indicators68. More systematically, there may well be important social and institutional differences 
which structure the incentives and capabilities towards retaliatory versus reconciliatory reactions to 
crime. And it is here, we would argue, that evolutionary psychology research resonates with three 
related models in comparative political economy: Hall and Soskice’s characterisation of ‘liberal’ and 
‘coordinated’ ‘varieties of capitalism’69; Esping-Andersen’s characterisation of the ‘worlds of welfare 
capitalism’70; and Lijphart’s characterisation of competitive versus consensus-oriented political 
systems71. Although a full and detailed exploration of these resonances is beyond the scope of a 
single paper, the main points of connection may readily be sketched.  
As we have seen, the notion of proportionality generates in itself no concrete limits to punishment; 
hence the question of how much - and indeed how - to punish remains open to the sway of 
convention, political decision, or expediency72. Prevailing conventions; the institutional structures 
within which they develop, and within which penal policy is formulated; and the quality and intensity 
of social relationships, themselves premised in part on conventions and institutional structures, 
become crucial to the construction of meaningful limits on punishment. Liberal market countries, 
which have in recent years moved to increasingly flexibilised economies, do not invest heavily in 
their members’ skills. In these countries, labour market conditions typically produce a high 
proportion of short-term and insecure jobs and, significantly for our argument, their heavy reliance 
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on monitoring to secure compliance is reflected in strikingly high levels of ‘guard labour’73. The 
conditions for  establishing high future Associational Value – and for evaluating it with any 
confidence -  would therefore seem to be weaker in liberal market economies than in coordinated 
market countries. For coordinated economies’ comparative advantage is built on long term 
investment in their members’ skills, an investment itself premised on the expectation of long term 
relationships of cooperation and mutual dependence between different groups. And these 
relationships help to foster intrinsic motivations for compliance with prevailing social norms (at least 
among insiders – an important caveat when it comes to penal policy74).  
The coordinated market economies, moreover, typically feature the more generous welfare systems 
which, particularly in their Nordic, social democratic form, represent a recognition of mutual 
interdependence and belonging and express a culture of solidarity which fosters trust relations (and 
which is strongly correlated, as shown by comparative research, with lower levels of punishment75). 
These welfare systems, one might say, represent an institutionalisation of the collective expectation 
that Associational Value between citizens will – and indeed ought to – be high and widespread. 
Moreover, we might expect Associational Value to be weaker – and hence the appeal to 
proportionality (or other metaphors aspiring to limit punishment) a less effective constraint on 
retributive reactions – in the countries with highly competitive, first-past-the-post political systems, 
where policy horizons tend to be relatively short term and policy platforms accordingly volatile, than 
in the consensus-oriented political systems typical of the northern European and Nordic countries. 
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For, in the latter countries, policy horizons tend to be longer term as interests within a 
proportionally representative system have to be bargained out in the process of coalition-formation: 
voters can accordingly have some confidence in the credibility of policy platforms on which parties 
stand for office76. It follows that these political systems not only depend on, and set up incentives 
encouraging actors to, compromise, but also foster the sort of stability and group cohesion which 
underpins greater expected Associational Value. Their capacity to limit punishment, in short, is 
dependent not on abstract appeals to proportionality but on social and political cohesion which 
fosters high Associational Value between citizens and hence an orientation towards reconciliation – 
conditions which are met to a greater degree in the coordinated systems of northern Europe and the 
Nordic countries than in the Anglo-Saxon, liberal market countries.77 
In other words, the psychological conditions which foster an orientation to reconciliation, through 
sustaining dense networks of mutual Associational Value, are better institutionally supported in 
coordinated market economies whose production regimes are premised on investment in long term 
relationships; in proportionally representative, consensus-oriented political systems in which there is 
a longer time frame for policy making; and in social democratic welfare systems which symbolise 
mutual dependency and which foster solidarity and relatively low levels of social inequality. To put 
this explicitly in terms of the Associational Value model set out above, a well coordinated labour 
market within a society in which mutual dependency and solidarity are also reflected in generous 
welfare state arrangements supports recognition of an aggressor’s work or other social productivity 
and expresses, at the level of the polity, an analogue of kinship relationships at the interpersonal 
level; the proportional political representation of all sectors creates both mutual dependency and 
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stability which enhances expected Associational Value; and mutual dependence and a prevalence of 
long term relationships within both economic and social relations prima facie seems likely to 
enhance the scope for both expectation of and effective communication of remorse or repentance, 
so as to preserve those relationships. The perfect conditions for forgiveness and reconciliation, like 
Durkheim’s ideal ‘conscience collective’, exist nowhere78. But the institutional structure of different 
societies has a decisive impact on extent to which they can be constructed, by affecting the 
opportunities and incentives of key actors such as judges, prosecutors, police officers, victims of 
crime  - and indeed all of us who vote on criminal justice policy. The importance of trying to 
understand the nature of this institutional impact can hardly be exaggerated.  
The question of what shapes the balance between retaliation and reconciliation has long been 
recognised by sociologists, anthropologists and criminologists as a crucial question about 
punishment.  Even those who, like G.H. Mead, see desert as the basic reason for punishment, and 
the expression of vengeance and affective blame as socially useful, acknowledge that these generate 
no stable criteria for the level of punishment, and so inevitably carry the risks of the escalation of 
aggression and of the stigmatisation of offenders as its flip side. As Mead put it: ‘We see society 
almost helpless in the grip of the hostile attitude it has taken towards those who break its laws and 
contravene its institutions’79; and, in a passage reminiscent of Durkheim; ‘hence ... the attitude of 
hostility, either against the transgressor of the laws or against the external enemy, gives to the 
group a sense of solidarity … which consumes the differences of individual interests, the price paid 
for this solidarity of feeling is great and at times disastrous’80. In the sway of these powerful 
emotional dynamics – recently seen perhaps most vividly, among advanced democracies, in the 
United States – appeals to proportionality are little more than empty rhetoric. What is needed, 
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rather, is an understanding of the institutional conditions which can structure the dynamics of 
collective action so as to inhibit the slide into stigmatisation and othering, and foster the 
reconciliatory dispositions.81 
 
 
Conclusion 
A certain form of retributivism, then - in the sense of a set of stable and effective criteria defining 
the fittingness of penalties by reference to a particular offence by a particular offender -, makes 
most sense within the cosmology, or moral economy, in which state penalties are enacted within, 
and widely regarded as integral to, a political system rooted in a symbolically legitimated status 
hierarchy. Moreover the legitimation of those penalties may be underpinned in some important 
ways by theological symbolism and various forms of religious doctrine and belief. Early modern 
punishments look to us crude and extreme expressions of revenge; but their meaning to 
contemporaries – notably to the spectators at the scaffold or to the consumers of the forms of 
popular culture mentioned earlier – was importantly premised on an afterlife, on expiation, on a 
symbolism of penitence. And they resonated with moral sensibilities in a less violence-averse and a 
more overtly status-based hierarchical world than ours. But in our social and political world – a 
world no longer organised around a moral order structured in terms of symbolically anchored 
notions of desert or appropriateness – there is no agreed mechanism for anchoring the penalty scale 
according to cardinal proportionality, and actual penalty scales are driven by convention, 
calculations of consequences, and political dynamics. Particularly under conditions of a highly 
politicised climate for criminal justice policy-making, the commitment to just deserts all too easily 
produces insatiable demands for hard treatment. Desert theorists believed that retributivism could 
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provide a limit to punishment by restricting its moral justification to the past-oriented criterion of 
proportionality with the seriousness of an offence. That its credentials on the first criterion are 
dismal is not surprising given that our prevailing culture is no longer premised on widely shared 
belief in a moral order structured around notions of desert or appropriateness grounded in widely 
shared symbols of equivalence.82  
But this sobering analytic conclusion should not, in our view, be interpreted as a counsel of despair. 
Few proponents of the justice model would want to recreate the hierarchical and authoritarian 
conditions which made retributive punishments such as the lex talionis meaningful to 
contemporaries, and religious affiliations and symbols of the sacred cannot be organised in 
democratic societies by processes of deliberate institutional reform, even should they seem 
attractive. The task, rather, is to consider what early modern societies can tell us about the links 
between the legitimation of punishment and broader social conditions; to reflect on the theoretical 
and practical resources which resonate with modern moral and political discourse;  and to ponder 
how best they may be institutionalised under particular conditions.  
Both moral commonality and the sense of a real relationship between victim and offender as fellow 
members of a society have doubtless been attenuated by the increasing heterogeneity and moral 
pluralisation of social orders, especially in the more individualistic, competitive, liberal market 
countries. Those countries in which the retributive revival appears to have had the most baleful 
effect in eroding the institutional counterpart to reconciliatory dispositions in the criminal process 
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are those in which inequality, conflict and heterogeneity are highest83. Conversely, scholarship on 
punishment in the Nordic countries associates their penal moderation with their relative 
homogeneity84, their relatively small size and hence sense of social interdependence, solidarity, and 
trust, their consensus-oriented political systems, and their relative levels of equality – all factors 
which foster conditions for the institutional counterpart of forgivingness85 and enhance expected 
Associational Value. The lesson for the more punitive – and less equal – liberal market countries is 
that avoiding polarisation and reducing inequality is likely to be as important as the effort to 
reconstruct the criminal process to effectively foster repentance and reconciliation; and that the key 
to penal moderation lies not only in reintegrative criminal justice policy, but in social policy and in 
political arrangements and institutional structures which maximise expected Associational Value 
among citizens.  
In conclusion, it is important to clarify that our argument about the incapacity of the neoclassical 
revival to generate a robust sense of limits on punishment is not to be taken as suggesting that 
consequentialist theories of punishment are immune from analogous difficulties, let alone to make a 
case for penal consequentialism. (In fact, one of us is inclined to take a restricted consequentialist 
line on punishment86, but that argument is for another day.) Even leaving aside the well known 
distributive difficulties with purely consequentialist arguments for punishment87, it will be evident 
that while many of the potentially positive consequences of punishment – deterrence, 
incapacitation, reform and so on – are in principle measurable with the increasingly sophisticated 
tools of the social sciences, the question of how much of any of them adequately balances the 
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infliction of a particular penalty remains an intractable moral question which cannot be reduced to 
any calculus, and one, moreover, on which views differ widely. In the realpolitik of penal practice, 
the key aspiration must be to determine the ethically optimal penal practices consistent with 
political legitimation. For modern consequentialists, as for modern retributivists, there is little 
alternative to the messy business of building political and social coalitions around agreed 
conventions specifying, and limiting, adequate penalties. Hence our knowledge, from comparative 
research, that the countries which have most successfully resisted the drift to penal severity since 
the 1970s are those whose social, economic and political institutions have given them maximum 
capacity to coordinate policy, in the public interest, over the long term is of key ethical significance88.  
The value pluralism and heterogeneity of modern societies, sitting alongside our commitment to 
democratic politics, complicates the tasks of both legitimising punishment and institutionalising 
arrangements favourable to reconciliation within a stable set of symbols and practical arrangements. 
The task has been yet further complicated by the spread of criminal law into ever greater areas of 
regulation89. The social task of legitimising and civilising punishment cannot be separated from that 
of legitimising and civilising the deployment of criminal law, and while our focus in this paper has 
been on punishment, we accept that, parallel to the argument which we have made about the 
institutional conditions under which appeals to penal proportionality can be made meaningful, we 
need to come to some understanding of the conditions for building support around institutions 
capable of delivering social coordination on criteria of fittingness or proportionality relevant to 
criminalisation. But whether we are focusing on punishment or on criminalisation, we should train 
our attention on the analysis and conditions of existence of institutions stabilising and implementing 
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substantive criteria of fittingness, rather than placing our reformist faith in the chimera of appeals to 
proportionality. 
 
